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UNSC5PORT397384096SGC-UK
20 JAN 16
| The Owen Report |
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After Action ReportFrom: MGEN Z. SMITH G2 (Corps Intelligence Officer) @ UNSGC GHQ NY USASent To: ALL UNSGC Personnel Subject: Abstract From Report Re Owen Debriefing Original Debriefing Date: 29 JUL 99 Declassification Date: 01 MAY 07 Revised: 20 JAN 16
References: Unless otherwise stated items inbetween square brackets "[ ]" are editor's insertions, and links highlighted in red are classified and their contents have therefore been redacted. Prior to being assigned to the CONTACT program the subject of the debriefing one Sergeant Ulysses Nicholas Owen (UNMC SN#199098), was a British Army regular serving as an NCO (Non-Commissioned-Officer) in the 22nd SAS (Special Air Service) a Regiment of the regular Army. His troop was stationed in Borneo during the period 1963~1964, and he was declared missing, presumed dead along with the other four members of his so-called "Claret patrol" in November of 1964, while participating in his Troop's service during the Indonesian Confrontation of 1962~1966. The Claret operations ["Claret" being the British Army's euphamism for "blood"], were cross boarder patrols/raids conducted by the SAS from Borneo into Indonesia against that nation's Special Forces. Although authorised by the then Secretary of State (Minister) for Defence Dennis Healey, the British Parleament was not informed, due to the potential diplomatic fallout. The objective was to stop the Indoneasian Army's Special Forces (ISF) units from conducting it's cross boarder terrorist raids, which were President Achmad Sukarno's attempt to destabilise the newly independant Borneo state. Owen's "Claret patrol", comprising four SAS troopers and a female MI6 (SIS - Secret Intelligence Service) operative on attachment, were involved in an unsanctioned flight, through an unknown Gate they discovered in the Kalimantan jungle on 13 OCT 64, returning via one (unknown #) at Vostok Base (aka Base-78, Antarctica), on 14 MAR 99 35 years later. Landing outside of the regular Gate cycle, shortly after CON-018, Op.CULLODEN, conducted on 07 MAR 99. Upon arrival Owen and his other team members were in extremely poor psychological health (PTSD), and two had suffered wounds in combat. As unlike other such instances, SGT (Sergeant) VORSFELDE. Karl., UNMC SN#100118 (RGHQ-51, declared MIA at CON-060) and SGT PETROV. Vladimir Rasputa., 2LT (Second Lieutenant), UNMC SN#203148, now retired, but who also formerly served at RGHQ-51, the patrol had consciously experienced the entire 35 years of flight in real time, without suffering any physical aging. Subsequentialy, on the 17th and 19th of March 1999 respectively, the patrol leader (CLASSIFIED) and his wingman (CLASSIFIED) succumbed to their injuries, due to the effects of poison delivered by a knife and a crossbow bolt. As it had been decided that it would be impossible to return them to either regular service, or to the general population for reasons of security, after five months treatment at the UNSGC's special medical center at AREA-51, Groomlake, Navada, USA, for PTSD (Post Tramatic Stress Disorder), Owen, the other surviving SAS trooper UNMC SN#199099 and the MI6 operative UNMC SN#199100, were released for evaluation and reassignment to the CONTACT program on 31 JUL 99. However, after one operation out of RGHQ-51 in the UK (CON-21, OPERATION TEWKSBURY, 21-22 AUG 99), all three suffered psychological breakdowns and were initially sent to Porton Down. Soon after, they were returned to AREA-51 in the USA for further treatment. On 01 NOV 06 Owen alone was returned to active service with the 51st Regiment of the UNMC, and is currently serving satisfactrially at RGHQ-51 in the UK. Relevant Abstract From Owen's AAR"On 09 OCT 64, a four man patrol, plus an attached female SIS operative, of which I was the 2IC [Second in command], was inserted by helicopter into the Long Jawai region [Borneo] with orders to cross the border into Kalimantan (Indonesia) in order to scout for troop concentrations indicative of planned enemy incursions [that is Indonesian Special Forces, aka ISF]. Patrol was under 'Claret' Standing Orders with depth of penetration across the border limited to 3000m.About 2000m inside the border evidence of an organised group of at least twelve men was discovered. It was decided to shadow the group in the hope of obtaining further intelligence. Proceeding with extreme caution and examining signs of passage indicated that the group were neither ISF or the local civilian population, as prints were of plain leather soled footwear and bushcraft, while good, was not of a standard to be expected from either the ISF or indiginous tribesman . This was considered to be evidence of the presence of unknown iregular enemy troops and while pursuit was continued further precautions were taken. Observing that the tracks were becoming fresher and reasoning that the distance to the enemy had closed a rally point was designated and Bergens [rucksacks] and other equipment cached. Following the trail led to an unusual rock formation consisting of two vertical columns heavily overgrown with vines and other vegetation, which appeared to have been partly cut back1. The trail led to a spot between the columns and then appeared to vanish. Suspecting that our presence had been detected and an ambush laid the patrol scattered to cover and remained in position for some time without detecting any enemy activity. At this point (CLASSIFIED) the Patrol Leader decided to further investigate the trail. With (CLASSIFIED) he approached the pillars while , UNMC SN#199099, UNMC SN#199100 and myself [Owen] remained in cover. It was at this point that a loud rumbling noise and an intense shimmering glow appeared around the pillars and both men vanished from sight. Both UNMC SN#199099, UNMC SN#199100 and myself [Owen], were unable to see what had happened, so we moved forward to investigate penetrating the glow. I immediately suffered a strong sense of displacement, disorientation and nausea. I along with my team mates were relieved to quickly locate our comrades unharmed and the patrol proceeded to scout the area. It became clear that we were no longer in the same place that we started from and that while still in primary jungle it was not a part of the Indonesian environment with which we were familiar. Compasses gave anomalous readings and geographical features had changed. In spite of the confusing circumstances the trail was once more viable and the decision was taken to follow in the hope of obtaining further intelligence. Observation of the trail indicated the men being followed were no longer observing proper jungle technique. This allowed the patrol to follow easily and by dusk we made audible contact without detection and had deduced that the targets had stopped for the night. Leaving the SIS operative and two of the men in a Lay Up position the patrol leader (CLASSIFIED) and myself [Owen] approached the camp under cover of darkness to make further observations. To our considerable surprise and concern we saw that the men were European and dressed in what was clearly military uniform and wearing some kind of respirator equipment. This latter point raised the possibility of some kind of local NBC ["Nuclear, Biological or Chemical"] threat. However, neither I nor the other members of my patrol had exhibited any symtoms to date, and we presumed for the duration that the threat must be either of a low level and persistent nature or not yet present but expected. It was decided that we should at our earliest attempt to acquire protective equipment for ourselves, subject to the issues of security. Though it was clear that they did not feel under direct threat from other ground or air forces, their camp was securely placed and sentries had been stationed. Observations of the camp were continued and it became clear that at least some of the stores and equipment had originated from Borneo/Indonesia and were of recent origin. Due to enemy noise discipline it was at this time not possible to identify the targets by insignia or language. Falling back to the remainder of the patrol observations were discussed and from the evidence gathered so far it seemed likely that the unknown force had been carrying out supply raids in Kalimantan and it was possible that this had caused previously unexplained reports of raids by British troops in areas were operations were not being carried out. The following day the group broke camp and headed off carrying the raided supplies. The patrol shadowed them and was able to remain unobserved. The group followed an observable trail and their movements indicated familiarity with the territory. On the second day (10 OCT 64), the group arrived at what appeared to be an established base camp, located upon the banks of a river. We in turn established a Lay Up Point and several OP's [Observation Posts], that were used over the following two days to attempt the collection of more intelligence. However this proved difficult due to the layout of the camp and the nature of the terrain. Enemy numbers was estimated at platoon strength [c.30-40]. On the fourth day (13 OCT 64), another raiding party of section strength [c.8-12] departed the camp and was tracked by us to the pillars previously mentioned. They took up a weak defensive formation, and proceeded to prepare what smelt like coffee. After three hours there was a loud rumbling noise and a bright light emenating from the rock formation. The group immediately broke camp and passed into the light and disappeared. Examination of the area showed that their tracks led too, but not beyond the formation. It was decided to Lay Up and observe, as based on previous experience we concluded that this unit would return by the same method. Discussion of the nature of the pillars was terminated on the grounds of security and irrelivance to our immediate situation. On the following morning just after sunrise [14 OCT 64], the now familiar noise and light emenated from the pillars, shortly followed by the appearance of the raiding party. We proceeded to track the group, who returned along precisely the same route as they had followed previously. Unfortunately, for reasons that were not clear, a member of the group suddenly turned and walked back along the trail at the exact time that (CLASSIFIED) was moving forward. Contact was inevitable and while obviously surprised by the appearance of (CLASSIFIED) the man immediately raised the alarm in German and also fired at (CLASSIFIED) with a crossbow, injuring him. It was at this point that it was discovered that the rifles carried by the patrol [L1A1 SLR's] were not functioning and we were unable to return fire2. With great presence of mind (CLASSIFIED) engaged the enemy using his rifle as a club. This allowed me [Owen] to reach him and assist him to cover. It was clear that the remainder of the enemy group had been alerted and were rapidly approaching. The patrol immediately retreated into the jungle with myself assisting (CLASSIFIED). By good fortune we were able to break contact and reach temporary shelter where (CLASSIFIED)'s wound was treated. The wound proved to be although unpleasant, not life threatening. As soon as immediate aid was completed the patrol continued to move away from the enemy who could clearly be heard hunting for us. Nightfall brought temporary respite however the hunt was expected to resume at daybreak. Such checks as could be carried out under the cover of darkness could find no explanation for the failure of the rifles but, given the circumstances it was clear that improvised weapons would be needed in the event of further encounters. All unnecessary material including rifles, ammunition and explosives was then cached and somewhat before dawn the Patrol continued it's attempts to permanently break contact with the enemy. Over the next several days [15-17 OCT 64] an extended hunt continued and in spite of the patrol's best efforts we were unable to escape our pursuers. Realising that with supplies running low it would only be a relatively short time before we would be forced into an encounter the decision was taken to take the fight to the enemy and in a series of ambushes during the night of the 17th, we were able to kill or disable the majority of the enemy group. The remainder eventually left the area. Examination of the enemy bodies revealed that the uniforms appeared to be of German WWII manufacture but had clearly been subject to hard wear and improvised repairs. Additionally equipment of distinctively German WWII manufacture was found as well as improvised weapons such as crossbows, knives and spears. We rearmed ourselves and releived the enemy of their NBC protection. The filters of the masks were a primative improvisation, but all the same welcome. It was decided to sever the heads of the dead in line with the practise of the indiginous tribesmen [of Borneo] to mask our identity. Once the enemy, and (CLASSIFIED)'s [the patrol leader] minor knife wound, had been dealt with the patrol found it's way back to the original column site and, observing that the shimmering effect occurred at intervals decided to pass between the columns during one of the 'activations' [18 OCT 64] in the hope of returning home." END OF ABSTRACT Editors Notes:1.The description fits the known standard profile of a Star Gate. The cut foliage, will most likely have been due to human intervention, ensuring clear access and fields of fire, a common practise on frequently used Gates.Following Owen's debriefing, a sustained covert search by Executive Resources over a ten month period (July 1999 - April 2000) eventually located the former position of the Kalimantan Gate. It had been extracted and moved by persons and to a location unknown. NB: NAKAMURA Industries had at that time secured oil exploration rights from President Achmad Sukarno's regime of Indonesia, for the Kalimantan area in 2000, rights that were subsequently not renewed. Estimates based upon the size of the hole indicate that the Gate was of small size, probably being no more than circa 17-18 tonnes. This is consistent with an end of or near end of Spline structure. No other Gates were or have been identified in the region to date. It is likely that it is an example of a loan installation, or the last of a sequence that has been lost to tectonic subduction (Indoneasia is the most volcanically active region on the planet). It should be noted that both the enemy as well as the patrol were, in spite of the 35 year flight duration, extremely fortunated that the Kalimantan Gate appears to have principly cycled between just the two specified locations. Normal Gate behaviour would have rendered the patrol lost somewhere on that Spline, which may well have had over a thousand possible destinations. 2. This is the typical weapon failure experienced by off world personnel equipped with firearms. Examination in good light would have revealed that although the firing pins of their weapons successfully struck and detonated the primers of their ammunition, the cartridges' propellant failled to ignite because all such materials above a certain mass are rendered inert due to passage through a worm hole. The mechanism for which remains a subject of continued scientific investigation and speculation.
Conclusions:TBA (FOR USE BY RGHQ-51 S2)END OF REPORT
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